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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of accounting information on the sequential judgments of experienced 
bank loan officers using realistic lending cases in an experimental setting. The findings suggest that loan 
officers reach a high level of confidence early in the lending process based on summarized accounting 
information and other general background data. When, later in the process, factors concerning the firm's 
financial plans and their underlying assumptions are varied, lenders adjust their confidence in whether or 
not to grant the loan in the expected directions, even when the subsequent evidence disconfirms their 
original positions. 
Accoun t i ng  in format ion  is used  in m a n y  busi- 
ness  dec is ions ,  inc lud ing  the  ve ry  impor t an t  
a rea  o f  bank  lending.  Even t h o u g h  financial  
a c c o u n t i n g  is said to b e  d e v e l o p e d  to  assist ex- 
ternal  users  in the i r  bus iness  dec is ions ,  w i th  the  
two  p r i m a r y  ex te rna l  use r  g roups  ident i f ied  as 
inves to rs  and  c r ed i t o r s  (FASB, 1978) ,  t he re  is 
ve ry  l i t t le  empi r i ca l  w o r k  that  e x a m i n e s  l end ing  
dec i s ions  and h o w  c red i t o r s  p roce s s  a ccoun t i n g  
data. 
W e  e x a m i n e  the  impac t  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  infor- 
ma t ion  on  the  sequen t i a l  j u d g m e n t s  o f  bank  loan  
officers us ing real is t ic  c o n d e n s e d  l end ing  cases  
in an e x p e r i m e n t a l  set t ing.  The  s tudy  ref lec ts  a 
h igh  d e g r e e  o f  ex t e rna l  validity,  and  p r o v i d e s  
n e w  insights  in to  h o w  and w h e n  var ious  types  o f  
a c c o u n t i n g  in format ion  are  used  in banks '  
c red i t -g ran t ing  dec i s ion  process .  
The  resul ts  o f  o u r  r e sea rch  sugges t  that  
l ende r s  r each  a high level  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  in the i r  
c red i t -g ran t ing  dec i s ions  ve ry  ear ly  in the  infor- 
ma t ion  ga the r ing  and eva lua t ion  process .  This 
init ial  con f idence  is based  o n  s u m m a r i z e d  
financial  a c c o u n t i n g  da ta  and o t h e r  b a c k g r o u n d  
informat ion.  At the  same  t ime,  l ende r s '  confi- 
d e n c e  in the i r  j u d g m e n t s  at s u b s e q u e n t  s tages  o f  
the  in fo rmat ion  ga the r ing  and eva lua t ion  pro-  
cess  a re  mate r ia l ly  a l t e red  by  m o r e  de ta i l ed  
forms o f  a c c o u n t i n g  data. Even in cases  w h e r e  
s u b s e q u e n t  in format ion  d i sconf i rms  p r i o r  judg-  
ments ,  l ende r s  r e s p o n d  by  revis ing  the i r  confi- 
d e n c e  in the  c red i t -g ran t ing  dec i s ion  cons i s t en t  
w i th  the  na tu re  o f  the  s u b s e q u e n t  ev idence .  
Whi l e  this  resul t  is cons i s t en t  w i th  the  c o m m o n  
f inding that  s t rong  init ial  c on f ide nc e  is o b t a i n e d  
ear ly  in t he  dec i s ion  process ,  it  is incons i s t en t  
w i th  the  many  s tud ies  that  f ind d i sconf i rming  
e v i d e n c e  no t  to  b e  s e a r c h e d  for  and /o r  to  be  ig- 
n o r e d  o n c e  a s t rong  initial  impre s s ion  has b e e n  
formed.  
The  s tudy  p r o v i d e s  e v i d e n c e  that  a c c oun t i ng  
da ta  have a mater ia l  impac t  on  l end ing  decis ions ,  
and  that  s u m m a r i z e d  bas ic  f inancial  s t a t emen t  
data, c o l l e c t e d  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  the  c l ien t  bor-  
r o w e r  ear ly  in the  p rocess ,  have  the  g rea tes t  im- 
pac t  on  the i r  dec i s ions  for the  class o f  b o r r o w e r  
e x a m i n e d  in this s tudy.  These  resul ts  po in t  to  a 
p r ev ious ly  u n e x p l o r e d  sou rce  o f  da ta  for fu ture  
inves t iga t ion  into accoun t ing ' s  ro le  in the  credi t -  
g ran t ing  process .  
The  nex t  sec t ion  o f  the  p a p e r  d i scusses  the  
na tu re  o f  the  c red i t -g ran t ing  process ,  and  the  
subse t  o f  c red i t -g ran t ing  dec i s ions  e x a m i n e d  in 
this  s tudy.  The  th i rd  s e c t i on  o f  the  p a p e r  
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describes the research design and hypotheses, 
with the results and analysis reported in the 
fourth section. The final section summarizes the 
results and implications for future research. 
THE LENDING ENVIRONMENT 
Synopsis o f  the lending process 
The first step in our project was to learn as 
much as possible about when and how account- 
ing information is actually used in the credit- 
granting process. Based on structured but open- 
ended interviews with chief lending officers at 
three major banks in Detroit, two major banks in 
Chicago and three large San Francisco banks, we 
found the following generalizations to hold. 
1. For small borrowers (e.g. sales of less than 
$10-$15 million) the quality of  the accounting 
data is very inconsistent, sometimes of limited 
use to lenders. Financial plans are generally un- 
available. Bank loans are an important source o f  
capital for these borrowers. 
2. For medium size borrowers (e.g. sales be- 
tween $20 and $40 million) the accounting in- 
formation is generally of acceptable quality and 
very important to the credit granting process. 
Financial plans are frequently available and of 
use to lenders. Bank loans are an important 
source of capital for these borrowers. 
3. For large borrowers, the accounting infor- 
mation is normally of a high quality, usually au- 
dited, and often more detailed than what is re- 
ported to investors in annual reports. Bankers' 
ability to obtain all accounting data may be li- 
mited by the borrower. However, detailed non- 
published data are often not necessary for len- 
ders to evaluate credit applications. These bank 
loans are frequently a small part of the capital re- 
quired by large borrowers, who use public debt, 
leases, etc., as their major sources of  capital. 
Based on this analysis, we determined that the 
medium sized borrowers would be of  greatest 
interest for this study. The inconsistency in smal- 
ler borrowers caused research design and valid- 
ity problems we chose not to deal with, while 
large borrowers might be better evaluated using 
publicly available data (e.g. analysis of bond rat- 
ings) rather than the experimental approach 
used here. 
Focusing our attention on medium sized bor- 
rowers, we interviewed lenders to identify those 
aspects of the sequence of data gathering and 
analysis that were common to the evaluation 
process across lending institutions. We focused 
on the lending decision for a new client. This 
situation provided the most unambiguous set- 
ting for evaluating the complete sequence of 
steps in the lending process. Decisions regarding 
existing borrowers were based heavily on track 
record and interpersonal relationships, making 
it difficult or impossible to isolate the effect of 
accounting information and creating serious in- 
ternal validity problems. 
We found the sequence of  the lending deci- 
sion process for new clients to be relatively easy 
to standardize, enabling generic lending cases to 
be developed around the following three phase 
process. 
Phase 1. Examine publicly available data on 
potential borrower to make a preliminary judg- 
ment on the quality of the proposed loan. 
Phase 2. Make personal contact with prospec- 
tive borrower, normally at borrower's place of 
business, to size up the borrower 's  operations 
and future financial and operating plans. 
Phase 3. Perform detailed credit analysis and 
evaluation of historical and forward-looking 
financial data to determine the likelihood of a 
successful loan. 
These three phases of the credit-granting deci- 
sion provide a framework for evaluating lenders' 
judgments as a sequential process. Detailed 
financial accounting data are the most dominant 
part of  the information set in phase 3, where cre- 
dit analysis is performed. However, rather than 
confining the experiment to manipulations ol 
phase 3 accounting data, our experiment investi- 
gates the entire sequence to determine the rela- 
tive importance of information at all three 
phases. ! We note that while accounting data are 
SOne drawback with generic cases focusing on phase three manipulations alone was the inconsistent role of the lending 
officer in the credit analysis. Lending officers at some banks do their own credit analysis while other banks employ separate 
credit analysts who work with or for lending officers. 
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the dominant ingredient in phase 3, important  
accounting data are introduced at all three ph- 
ases of  information gathering and evaluation. 
Details o f  lending phases 
Phase one of  the credit  evaluation process  in- 
volves gathering background information on a 
prospect ive borrower,  including a brief history 
of the company and a credit  report.  This back- 
ground data includes highly summarized 
financial report  information, such as a credit  rat- 
ing, details about location(s), number  of  
employees,  when the company began, names of 
key officers, and so on. When current,  the credit  
reports from financial services such as Dun & 
Bradstreet (D & B) are considered by lenders to 
be the most  useful source of information in 
phase 1. These credit  reports  contain data from 
financial statements voluntarily submit ted to the 
credit  service by the most  closely held com- 
panies. The D & B report  also indicates whe ther  
the statements are audited, reviewed or com- 
piled, the name of the CPA firm (if  any), any un- 
usual features of  the data, and other pert inent  in- 
formation. The combination of the credit  re- 
ports and the lender 's  knowledge of  the client's 
officers, major owners,  lines of  business and in- 
dustry position (facilitated by such sources as 
Robert Morris Surveys) provide the background 
data included in phase 1. 
Phase 2 of  the process involves a personal "siz- 
ing up" of the borrower ' s  business prospects  and 
managerial skills. This phase normally includes 
an on location visit by the lender. Any back- 
ground data missing from what is normally col- 
lected in phase 1 is usually collected during 
phase 2. Also, phase 2 normally contains a dis- 
cussion with the client as to the purpose  of  the 
loan, their future operating plans and their 
financial plans for the repayment  of  the loan. 
Detailed historical and forward-looking 
accounting data are normally either collected by 
the lender during their visit with the borrower ,  
or  else forwarded to the bank soon after the visit. 
These accounting data help lenders to assess the 
need for the loan, its purpose, and the quality of  
the borrower ' s  organization. In conjunction 
with the interpersonal aspects of  the visit these 
financial accounting data provide important sig- 
nals to lenders regarding the borrower ' s  produc- 
tion capabilities, financial planning and control  
procedures,  and the overall integrity of the man- 
agement team. The availability of  detailed 
operating and financial data during the visit is an 
important signal to lenders in assessing manage- 
ment 's  financial preparedness. 
In phase 3 the lender performs detailed 
evaluations of  the historical and forward-looking 
accounting data. This process is designed to de- 
termine whether  the forward-looking data pro- 
vide for the successful repayment  of  the loan 
from future operations, and whether  the under- 
lying assumptions about  the future along with 
historical facts from past performance are suffi- 
ciently supportive of  such a plan. The phase 3 
analysis, along with the other  data collected in 
earlier phases culminates in a decision to grant 
or  not grant the proposed loan. The decision is 
made by an individual or a group, depending on 
the lending officer's authorized lending limit and 
other  bank policies." 
Factors affecting lending 
We expected  loan officers to develop high 
levels of  confidence in lending judgments early 
in the process, but also to modify their confi- 
dence  in response to signals they receive during 
the process. 
Judgment  research has shown that in settings 
lacking clear and quick ou tcome feedback, 
decision-makers display ex t reme and inapprop- 
riate confidence in the quality of  their judg- 
ments  (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). Oskamp 
(1965)  demonstrated that such over-confidence 
occurs  even among exper ienced professionals 
making routine professional judgments. In addi- 
tion, once settled on a hypothesis, judges typi- 
cally do not consider evidence that is discon- 
'For example, a given lending officer might have a limit of  $200,000, meaning he or she can approve loans up to $200,000 
without committee  approval, but is required to make a presentation to a committee  for loans in excess of  $200,000. Within 
the same bank there may be some  officers with,  say, gl,O00,O00 limits, while  others may have $250,000 limits, and so on. 
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firming or consistent with alternative hypoth- 
eses (Elstein etal., 1978; Lord etaL, 1979; Koriat 
et aL, 1980). 
However, we believe that bank loan officers 
work in a decision-making environment that fos- 
ters a different pattern of confidence modifica- 
tion. First, they must anticipate defending their 
loan decisions before a loan committee. Such a 
setting has been shown to enhance people's 
memory of cues and to incorporate more cues in 
their judgments (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975). 
Loan officers encounter  a wide variety of loan 
situations both personally and through reports 
of colleagues (Holt, 1984). This may allow them 
to imagine alternative hypotheses and, as 
Einhorn & Hogarth (1982)  posit, reduce the 
credibility of  a favored hypothesis. Moreover, 
there is evidence that expert decision-makers 
who must justify their judgments are able to de- 
tect and respond to subtle variances in routinely 
analyzed data (Danos et aL, 1984). 
EXPERIMENTS AND HYPOTHESES 
The decision variable 
The three phases of the information-gathering 
and evaluation process provide a framework 
within which lenders' sequential judgements are 
examined. The decision variable of interest eli- 
cited from lenders at each stage in this informa- 
tion gathering and evaluation process is the con- 
fidence in their judgment that the loan would be 
granted or not granted. Our search of the litera- 
ture revealed that very little work had been done 
on the lending decision, and that the decision 
variable used on some widely referenced prior 
work focused on the interest rate as the decision 
variable (Libby, 1979). However, our interviews 
with bankers revealed that interest rate is not of 
great importance during the decision process. It 
seems that interest rate is more an institutional/ 
market condition variable rather than one consi- 
dered by individual loan officers in assessing po- 
tential borrowers. The rate of return for a loan is 
affected by interest rate and other factors such as 
the mix of other services a client might commit 
to in conjunction with a loan. 
Alternatively, it is very realistic to assume that 
lenders have a feel for how likely it is that a pro- 
posed loan will be granted at any stage of the in- 
formation-gathering and evaluation process. 
That the process has three fairly distinct and uni- 
form phases to it enhances their ability to pro- 
vide interim judgments at these three points in 
the process. Given that our interest in this exper- 
iment is to learn more about the relative impor- 
tance of the information found in the three diffe- 
rent phases, we evaluate changes in confidence 
in the grant/not grant decision after each of the 
three stages. 
In order to compare bankers' decisions across 
lending institutions and lenders, we examine 
lenders' confidence in their decision to grant or 
not grant a proposed loan by recording three 
separate observations for each case, we allow 
each subject's change in confidence to be the 
measurement of  interest. Also, at the conclusion 
of each case we elicit the lender's subjective 
probabilit T that the loan described in the case 
will be "fully serviced". 
Experimental  instruments 
Many different variables included in the three 
phases of data collection and analysis were can- 
didates for manipulation. From the set of  realis- 
tic possibilities, we chose to evaluate several 
dimensions considered to be important in the 
lending process. Our discussions with bankers 
suggested that their decision processes were in- 
fluenced by risk class. As a result, we developed 
two corporate cases, one a financially strong and 
one a financially weak case, for use in the experi- 
ments. Once the basic financial risk level was es- 
tablished, a large number of  potential manipu- 
lated variables became "fLxed" in order to main- 
tain the overall realism of each case. For 
example, historical financial accounting data are 
a key element in risk assessment, and the man- 
ipulation of  these historical data would not be 
possible if they changed the inherent risk man- 
ifested in the data. 
A second manipulated variable was the initial 
availability of the prospective financial data dur- 
ing the phase 2 visit to the borrowers. While all 
borrowers could be expected to have historical 
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data on hand, only those who  had prepared for- 
ward-looking data consistent with a feasible 
term loan would be ready to provide such data 
during the visit. The prospect ive  accounting 
data provided a signal of  management ' s  planning 
compe tence  and the degree  of  attention they 
had devoted to how the proposed  loan would be 
emp |oyed  and repaid. 
The final manipulated variable also came from 
the forward-looking accounting data. Even in 
cases where  forward-looking data are not ini- 
tially available at the first visit, we  assumed that 
such data would be presented to the bank before 
the lending process advanced to phase 3. The 
nature of  the assumptions underlying the for- 
ward-looking operating results was able to be  
realistically manipulated without  conflicting 
with the underlying riskiness implied by the his- 
torical data. The assumptions motivating the 
prospect ive accounting data were  of  great in- 
terest to lenders in their assessment of  the suc- 
c(~ssful payback of  the loan. 
The variations examined in phase 1 (P1), 
phase 2 (P2),  and phase 3 (P3)  of  the lending 
process are outlined in Fig. 1. The accumulation 
of  data implicit in this sequencing is consistent 
with the decision process described by lending 
officers except  that, for experimental  purposes, 
we employ  discrete elicitation points. The actual 
decision may be continuous. 
The exper iment  was designed primarily to 
examine h o w  confidence is formed and mod- 
ified in a lending situation. This was accom- 
plished by measuring how the lenders'  confi- 
dence changed over  t ime and how variations in 
accounting data affected their confidence. 
We manipulated the risk variable as a within- 
subject t reatment  so that each subject received 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Financially strong case 
with 'background 
information including 
current D & B report 
i Management financial plan J 
is available during visit 
I Management financial plan is J 




Assumptions of plan are J 
well-grounded I 
Assumptions of plan are I 
not well-grounded I 
Assumptions of plan are 
well-grounded 
Assumptions of plan are 
not well-~'ounded 
Assumptions of plan are 
well-grounded 
Financially weak case 
with background 
information including 
current D & B report 
I Management financial plan 
is available during visit 
I Management financial plan is 
not available during visit 
I I, Assumptions of plan are not well-grounded 
Assumptions of plan are 
well-grounded I / 
Assumptions of plan are 
not well-grounded 
Fig. 1. Variations in inform2Uon available to lenders in a typical lending setting. 
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both the financially strong and the financially 
weak cases. The risk level was established by 
using summarized historical financial data and 
their corresponding actual risk "rating" as pre- 
pared by Dun & Bradstreet for two actual com- 
panies. The accounting data used as t reatments 
in the second and third stages of the evaluation 
process for each case were  in t roduced on a 
between-subject  basis. Each subject  received 
the same level of the phase 2 and phase 3 treat- 
ments for both cases. Each subject  provided 
three responses concerning their  confidence in 
the grant/not grant decision for each of the two 
cases, one response after each phase. The re- 
sponses called for the lender  to predic t  on the 
basis of the data received to that point  m after 
phase 1, after phase 2 and after phase 3, whether  
or  not the loan would be granted, and then to in- 
dicate how confident  they were  that their pre- 
dict ion would be the correc t  one in 100 identi- 
cal cases. The repeated measurements  taken 
after introducing phase 2 and phase 3 provided 
an indication of the change in their  confidence 
attributable to the new information in phase 2 
and phase 3. 5 
At the conclusion of each case, we asked each 
subject  to evaluate the probabil i ty  that, if 
granted, the loan descr ibed in the case would be 
fully serviced. This follow up question provided 
a check of our  pr imary elicitation concerning 
their  confidence in the grant/not grant decision, 
since confidence should be associated with their  
belief  that the loan would  be fully serviced. 
Subjects and  adminis trat ion 
The exper iments  were  administered to 52 
subjects at five major midwest  and west coast 
banks. The lenders part ic ipated in groups of 
from 2 to 15 subjects in their  respect ive bank's 
facilities, and were  randomly assigned to treat- 
ment groups. The time to comple te  the experi-  
menus ranged from 65 to 95 minutes, with an 
average t ime of 75 minutes. Information pro- 
vided to the subjects was closely contro l led  by 
the researchers,  and none of the exper imental  
materials were  revealed to the part icipating 
banks until administrat ion of the experiments.  
We administered the exper iments  in person, 
providing a br ief  and uniform introduct ion and 
then remained at hand to answer any questions. 4 
Neither the order  of  presentat ion nor the cases 
themselves appeared to affect the t ime spent, 
with most subjects spending approximately 
equal t ime on the two cases. Very few questions 
were  asked once the pract ice  set materials were  
completed.  
Testable hypotheses 
The exper iment  was designed to permit  us to 
evaluate the impact of  the three manipulated 
variables on lending judgments. On the basis of 
our  f ield~ork,  we bel ieved that the risk level 
would be a significant factor, but  we were  uncer- 
tain as to how it might interact with the other  
data provided.  
In addition, we were  interested in the pat tern 
of responses for each case. How confident  would 
lenders be after the first phase? As they received 
additional information in the second and third 
stage, how would their  confidence in their  judg- 
ment  change? Would  judgments  change from 
grant to not grant or  vice versa? Would the de- 
tailed financial reports  analyzed in phase 3 sig- 
nificantly increase lenders '  confidence? Is a 
higher  level of confidence attained earl ier  in the 
process  with nonrisky borrowers  versus risky 
borrowers? By observing the patterns of re- 
sponses we expec ted  to gain insight into these 
previously unexplored  issues. 
We expec ted  high confidence levels begin- 
ning at phase 1 as consistent  with previous 
studies. However,  the f ieldwork also helped us 
~Samples of the experimental materials are available from the authors upon request. 
4The researchers presented a brief verbal infi-oduction and worked through a "practice set" with the subjects to familiarize 
them with the experimental instruments and judgment elicitation, answering any questions concerning the task during the 
practice session. This introduction took between 8 and 13 minutes to complete, depending on  the presenter and the 
questions. Once the subjects were comfortable with the experimental instruments, they were free to work through the two 
(randomly ordered) cases and the ~concluding questions" at their own pace. 
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develop additional expectations at variance with 
the previous findings that subjects fail to search 
for or to use disconfirming evidence. Lenders 
told us that the availability of forward-looking 
accounting data signaled management planning 
competence,  as did the quality of  the assump- 
tions upon which the data were based. We ex- 
pected, therefore, that the confidence of  our len- 
der subjects would be modified consistent with 
the direction of  these variables. In other  words, 
the availability of well grounded forward-look- 
ing accounting data (a positive signal) would in- 
crease their confidence in a"grant" decision and 
decrease their confidence in a "not grant" deci- 
sion. 
RESULTS 
Our results are reported in two parts. The first 
deals with the bankers' sequence of  responses 
concerning their confidence in the grant/not 
grant decision elicited at three point in each 
case. The second part deals with the bankers' 
evaluation of  the likelihood that a loan like the 
one described in the case would be fully ser- 
viced if it were granted. 
Results of confidence experiments 
The subjects were nearly unanimous about 
the basic grant/not grant decisions. For the finan- 
cially weak case, 48 of 52 bankers judged that 
the loan would not be granted after the initial 
data revealed in phase 1, with one additional 
banker changing from "grant" to "not grant" after 
phase 3. For the financially strong case 47 of  52 
subjects initially judged that the loan would be 
granted, with three more switching to "grant" 
during the experiment. 
As expected, lenders' overall level of confi- 
dence in their judgments increased as additional 
information was provided. Table 1 shows the 
overall mean level of  confidence after each of  
the three phases of  information was revealed in 
the two cases (without regard to other  manipu- 
lated variables). 
For the financially weak case, the initial level 
of confidence in their judgments after phase 1 
TABLE 1. Mean confidence in judgements 
(all subiects, all treatments) 
Financially Financially 
strong case weak case 
(Grant the loan) (Not grant the loan) 
After phase I where 
background data is 
obtained 
ARer pbase 2 where 
the visit is made to 
the client's offices and 
forecast is either avail- 
able or not available 
After phase 3 where the 
the financial statements 
and forecasts are 
obtained. The forecasts 
have either high or 




was quite high (72), suggesting that a great deal 
of information is obtained even before the len- 
der meets with a prospective borrower. The 
meeting and information revealed in phase 2 is 
associated with an increase in confidence for the 
financially weak case, from 72 to 77 or + 5, while 
the detailed analysis of  historical and forward- 
looking financial data in phase 3 resulted in a 
slightly greater increase in confidence (from 77 
to 83 or +6) .  For the financially strong case, the 
subjects initial average confidence in their judg- 
ments was somewhat higher than for the finan- 
cially weak case (74 vs 72), providing evidence 
that lenders have a great deal of confidence in 
their expected lending judgments prior to ever 
meeting with a new client. The signals from the 
meeting in phase 2 had only a moderate positive 
impact on average confidence (from 74 to 76 or 
+ 2), while the detailed historical and forecasted 
financial data once again had a great effect on 
average confidence (from 76 to 82 or +6).  On 
average, lenders predicted after phase 3 that in 
82 of 100 cases like the financially strong case 
the loan would be granted. 
We note that the data in phase 1 contained 
highly summarized financial data while phase 3 
revealed detailed financial statement data. Based 
on the high initial confidence levels after phase 1 
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and the significant increase in confidence after 
phase 3, we suggest that financial statement data, 
both historical and prospective, play a pivotal 
role in the lending decision process. The results 
are consistent with the premise that both  highly 
summarized financial statement data from inde- 
pendent sources a n d  detailed historical and 
prospective financial statement data and 
financial ratios normally examined in phase 3 
contain information that is useful to lenders. 
Of particular interest was the relatively high 
level of  initial confidence in the lending judg- 
ment after phase 1 alone. This outcome provides 
new evidence concerning the importance of 
basic financial statement data and other facts 
prepared by independent services and purch- 
ased by lenders as a primary source of initial 
information about a prospective client. The im- 
portance of the information and analysis pro- 
vided by these services should not be under- 
stated. The analysis of financial statements of 
closely held companies provided by services 
such as Dun & Bradstreet may influence lending 
decisions as much as bankers own direct analysis 
of detailed financial statements. It seems likely 
that other research might find Dun & Bradstreet 
analysis useful in evaluating economic aspects of 
smaller closely held businesses. 
Within the overall results reported in Table 1, 
we examined the effect of two manipulated 
accounting variables that provided important 
information to lenders: initial availability of for- 
ward-looking accounting data (A) and the qual- 
ity of the assumptions used to prepare the for- 
ward-looking data (Q). Tables 2 and 3 report the 
ANOVA results of the experiment for the two 
cases separately. 5 The ANOVA results for be- 
tween-subject manipulations of A and Q are re- 
ported separately from the within-subject ef- 
fects concerning the time sequence of confi- 
dence measures (designated T for timing ef- 
fects) and their interactions with A and Q. The 
results are quite different for the two cases. The 
manipulated variables ( a  and Q)  tend to have 
less of  a systematic effect on the sequential con- 
fidence judgments in the financially weak case 
(Table 2) when compared to the financially 
strong case (Table 3). While the manipulation 
for the quality of the forecast assumptions (Q)  
introduced in the final set of  information (phase 
3) was important in both cases (17 = 0.07 in 
Table 2 andp  = 0.00 in Table 3), the initial avail- 
ability of the forecasts (A) introduced in phase 2 
was only significant in the financially strong case 
(Table 3 ,p  = 0.00). The mean changes in confi- 
dence reported at the top of Tables 2 and 3 
reveal similar patterns. With the exception of 
one change in Table 3, lenders responded to the 
additional information with an increase in confi- 
dence. The exception occurred in the financially 
strong case when lenders discovered low quality 
forecast assumptions in phase 3, the final infor- 
mation set, after finding forecasts available dur- 
ing their visit. In response to this combination of  
treatments lenders reduced their average confi- 
dence that the loan would be granted. 6 
The pattern of changes in confidence for the 
financially strong case generally reveals "good 
news" levels of manipulated variables having a 
greater confidence-increasing effect on lenders 
GRANT predictions than "bad news" manipula- 
tions. The opposite is true for the financially 
weak case, where "bad news" manipulations in- 
crease lenders' confidence in their NOT GRANT 
predictions more than "good news" manipula- 
tions. 
The overall patterns revealed in Table 1 are 
augmented by the results reported in Tables 2 
and 3, which show the effects of confirming and 
disconfirming levels of information w i t h i n  the 
phase 2 and phase 3 data sets. We see that initial 
availability of forward-looking data from phase 2 
has less impact on lender confidence than does 
the quality of  the assumptions provided in phase 
SThis simplifies the analysis. ANOVA results with the two cases as a within-Subject variable do not alter the conclusions or 
the strength of the results. 
6Recall that the information provided in each of the last two phases includes more than the manipulated variable. Only if the 
manipulated variable is relatively important and of a disconfirming nature w o u l d  w e  expect a decline in lenders' average 
conf idence  concern ing  the grant/not grant decision. 
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Mean change in confidence 
Phase 1 - Phase 2 -  
phase 2 phase 3 
Initially 
available 
High 1 2.69% 0.77% 
Low 2 6.15% 9.00% 
Not initially 
available 
High 3 6.54% 4.54% 
Low 4 4.62% 8.62% 
Analysis o f  variance 
Between-subject: SS DF MS F Tail probability 
Availability of forecast 
in phase 2 (A) 67.85 ! 67.85 0.68 0.42 
Quality of forecast 
assumpUons in phase 3 (Q) 347.12 1 347.12 3.46 0.07 
A x Q 124.96 1 124.96 1.24 0.27 
Error 48 ! 7.92 48 100.37 
Within-subjects: 
Timing (T) effect of first 
and second confidence 
m e a $ u r e s  
T×A 
TXQ 
T X A X Q  
Error 
7.54 1 7.54 0.07 0.79 
0.15 1 0.15 0.0o 0.97 
162.50 1 162.50 1.51 0.23 
0.35 1 0.35 0.o0 0.96 
5169.46 48 107.70 
3. For the financially weak case, even  as lenders  
approached  high levels of  conf idence  that the  
loan reques t  wou ld  no t  be  granted,  their  average 
conf idence  in the no t  grant  dec is ion  increased at 
a m u c h  s lower  rate w h e n  p resen ted  wi th  high 
quali ty assumptions.  Our  f ie ldwork led us to ex- 
pec t  that bo th  detai led historical  data and for- 
ward- looking data w o u l d  be  impor t an t  e l ements  
in l end ing  decis ions for compan ies  similar  to ou r  
cases. However,  the quali ty of  the assumpt ions  
c o n c e r n i n g  future  accoun t ing  pe r fo rmance  was 
the impor tan t  accoun t ing  a t t r ibute  normal ly  
found  in the phase 3 data that offered a realistic 
variable to, manipu la te  wi thou t  cont rad ic t ing  
the historical  f inancial  data provided  in phase 1.7 
The  impor t ance  of  forward-looking accoun t ing  
data is wel l  d o c u m e n t e d  in the accoun t ing  liter- 
a ture  (e.g. Brown et  aL, 1985),  wi th  the predic-  
t ive role of accoun t ing  data established as an ob- 
ject ive by  the  FASB's Conceptua l  Framework  
(FASB, 1978). Here, we  find empir ical  ev idence  
suppor t ing  the  usefulness of forward-looking 
accoun t ing  data in a major  class of  credit-grant- 
ing decisions,  l end ing  fur ther  c r edence  to their  
~The detailed historical data in phase 3 needed to be consistent with the earlier data (from phase 1 ) to maintain realism since 
Dun & Bradstreet reports are rarely at variance with the detailed financial statements. Likewise, the forward-looking data 
were effectively required for the class of borrowers examined here, with the availability of these data (in phase 2) and the 
assessed quality of the underlying assumptions (in phase 3) representing important and realistic attributes that were capable 
of manipulatioo without confounding. 
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Mean change in confidence 
Phase 1 - Phase 2 -  
phase 2 phase 3 
Initially 
available 
High 1 4.62% 9.23% 
LoW 2 1.6996 (7.00%) 
Not initially 
available 
High 3 0.38% 12.31% 
Low 4 0.92% 9.69% 
Analysis of variance 
Between-subject: SS DF MS F Tail probability 
Availability of forecast 
in phase 2 (A) 354.46 1 354.46 8.86 0.00 
Quality of forecast 
assumptions in phase 3 (Q) 732.46 1 732.46 18.30 0.00 
A x Q 473.88 1 473.88 11.84 0.00 
Error 1911.15 48 40.02 
Within-subjects: 
Timing (T) effect of first 




T x A X Q  
Error 
448.62 1 448.62 6.17 0.02 
996.96 1 996.96 13.70 0.00 
440.35 1 440.35 6.05 0.02 
167.54 1 167.54 2.30 0.14 
3492.54 48 72.76 
informat ion  conten t .  
Likel ihood o f  f u l l y  serviced loan 
The second  set of  results suppor ted  the effi- 
cacy of  our  pr imary  tests. These results  concern-  
ing the l ikelihood that the loan in each case will 
be  fully serviced are analyzed in a 2 x 4 ANOVA 
repor ted  in Table  4. The two variables, risk (a t  
two levels)  and t r ea tment  c o n c e r n i n g  forward- 
looking data (at  four levels equal to the four 
combina t ions  of t rea tments  A and Q in Fig. 1 ) 
were  bo th  s ignif icant . .The loan for the finan- 
cially weak case was perce ived  as m u c h  less 
likely to be  fully serviced than that of  the finan- 
cially s t rong case loan which  speaks to the per- 
ceived quali ty of  the two loans. Although the risk 
level was cer ta inly  dominan t  in terms of  
explanatory  power,  the four combina t ions  of 
t rea tments  regarding forward-looking account-  
ing data were  also significant at the 0.05 level. 
Note that the accoun t ing  t rea tments  are still a 
be tween-sub jec t  manipu la t ion  here.  This result  
provides  further  ev idence  of the impor tance  of 
prospec t ive  accoun t ing  informat ion  in lenders '  
j udgment s  of the overall  quali ty of the loan. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
These  exper iments ,  c o n d u c t e d  with experi-  
e nc e d  l end ing  officers, suggest  that the manipu-  
lated variables were  influential  in the con tex t  of 
the dec is ion  tasks examined.  The  perce ived  risk 
level of  the b o r r o w e r  had a significant impact  on  
how  subsequen t  informat ion  was apparent ly  
used. Also, we  no te  that average lender  confi- 
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strong case weak case 
Initially 
available 
High 1 87% 38% 
Low 2 78% 24% 
Not initially 
available 
High 3 73% 28% 
Low 4 82% 23% 
Analysis of variance 
Between-subject: SS DF 
Forecast effects (A and Q) 2751 3 
Subjects within group 
(error) 16,201 48 
Within-subjects: 
Risk (financially strong 
or weak case) 68,188 1 
Risk X forecast effects 680 3 
Risk x subject within 











d e n c e  after  see ing  the  initial  ( p r e m e e t i n g )  da ta  
for b o t h  cases  was qu i t e  high, and  the  da ta  pro-  
v ided  subsequen t l y  in phase  2 and phase  3 
s e e m e d  to have  an overa l l  conf i rming  effect  on  
the  l ende r s '  c o n f i d e n c e  in the i r  g ran t /no t  grant  
p red ic t ions .  These  resul ts  suggest  that  l ender s  
r each  a ve ry  h igh  level  o f  c o n f i d e n c e  ear ly  in the  
p roce s s  based  on  h ighly  s u m m a r i z e d  financial  
a c c o u n t i n g  in format ion  and o t h e r  gene ra l  back- 
g r o u n d  data. Fur ther ,  wh i l e  l ende r s  c o n t i n u e  to  
reg i s te r  s ignif icant  increases  in con f idence  as 
add i t iona l  da ta  are  r ece ived ,  s e l d o m  does  s u b -  
a c c o u n t i n g  da ta  a re  typ ica l ly  o b t a i n e d  at two  
po in t s  for  n e w  cl ients:  first f rom i n d e p e n d e n t  
c red i t - r a t ing  se rv ices  in a s u m m a r i z e d  ye t  infor- 
ma t ive  f inancial  profi le;  and" second ,  f rom the  
c l ien ts  themselves .  Both  sou rces  o f  h is tor ica l  
da ta  a p p e a r  to be  impor tan t .  Since the  h is tor ica l  
a c c o u n t i n g  data  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  p r o c e s s e d  by  
c red i t - r a t ing  se rv ices  appears  to  have  a signifi- 
cant  ear ly  impac t  on  the  c red i t -g ran t ing  dec i s ion  
process ,  and  b e c a u s e  the  use  o f  these  se rv ices  is 
pe rvas ive  a m o n g  l end ing  ins t i tu t ions ,  a g rea t  
dea l  o f  insight  might  b e  ga ined  by  fur ther  investi-  
s equen t  in format ion  cause  t h e m  to a l te r  the i r  irff-- - ga t ions  o f  p rec i se ly  h o w  these  se rv ices  use  
itial g ran t /no t  grant  judgment .  Still, t hey  reac t  
s ignif icant ly  in the  e x p e c t e d  w a y  to i nc remen ta l  
da ta  w h i c h  conf i rm o r  d i sconf i rm the i r  p r i o r  be-  
liefs, as e v i d e n c e d  b y  the  impac t  o f  the  manipu-  
hated a c c o u n t i n g  variables.  
Several  conc lus ions  can b e  d r a w n  f rom this 
s tudy.  First, it  conf i rms  the  overa l l  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
h i s tor ica l  and  fo rward- look ing  accoun t i ng  infor- 
ma t ion  in the  l end ing  dec i s ion  process .  These  
GAAP financial  s ta tements ,  and  h o w  they  dif- 
fe ren t ia te  b e t w e e n  GAAP and non  GAAP ac- 
c o u n t i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  in p e r f o r m i n g  the i r  c r ed i t  
eva lua t ion  service.  
This e v i d e n c e  is cons i s t en t  w i th  the  con ten-  
t ion  that  p r o s p e c t i v e  a c c o u n t i n g  da ta  a re  used  as 
signals o f  m a n a g e m e n t  p lann ing  c o m p e t e n c e .  
P rov id ing  we l l -g rounded ,  fo rward- look ing  da ta  
for  l e n d e r  examina t i on  s e e m s  to signal c r ed i t  
246 PAUL DANOSetaL 
w o r t h i n e s s .  T h e  r e s u l t s  a l so  te l l  u s  s o m e t h i n g  
a b o u t  h o w  l e n d e r s  m a k e  d e c i s i o n s .  E x p e r i e n c e d  
l e n d e r s  d o  m o d i f y  t h e i r  c o n f i d e n c e  as n e w  infor -  
m a t i o n  is p r o c e s s e d ,  e v e n  w h e r e  t h e  s igna l s  dis- 
c o n f i r m  t h e i r  p r i o r  p o s i t i o n s .  
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